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Abstract
This article deals with the reliability analysis and architecture definition of a fault-tolerant electro-mechanical actuator
system for unmanned aerial vehicle applications. Starting from the basic layout of the flight control system of a medium
altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, the attention is focused on the fault mode analysis of the single electro-
mechanical actuator system, with the purpose of pointing out the effects of architectural choices on the system reliabil-
ity. The electro-mechanical actuator system, developed to be a self-monitoring equipment, has three operating modes:
normal, fail-operative and fail-safe. Reliability and safety budgets are quantitatively evaluated via fault tree analysis using
typical failure rates of system components, and the most critical paths are identified and discussed.
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Introduction
Electrically powered actuators are nowadays the refer-
ence technology for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
flight controls, and their applicability is quite proved in
terms of performances.1–4 Electro-mechanical solutions
allow to attain load, speed and dynamic response objec-
tives,5 but several concerns are still open in terms of
reliability. In particular, the use of electro-mechanical
actuators (implying less maintainability constraints,
thanks to the elimination of hydraulic fluids) requires a
cautious approach to safety issues, mainly for a lack of
statistical database about components’ fault modes.6
An effective counteraction is provided by redundant
architectures managed by health-monitoring electro-
nics, in order to obtain fail-operative and/or fail-safe
actuators.7–10 With reference to a basic electro-
mechanical actuator system (EMAS), composed of a
control electronics, a power electronics, an electrical
motor and a gear reducer, several strategies can be used
to reach this goal. Mechanical redundancies can be
employed in torque summing or velocity summing
architectures.9,10 Electric redundancies can operate in
multiple lanes for both control and power electro-
nics.7,11 The choice about the number and the type of
redundancies depends on the target reliability allocated
to the actuator which, in turn, depends on the whole
flight control system (FCS) architecture and its overall
reliability. For example, the split of control surfaces
into independent sub-surfaces, each one actuated by a
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single EMAS, makes the total loss of control (LOC) of
the actuators less critical. System health monitoring
with fault detection and isolation is also a key issue in
order to make the EMAS operative in case of partial
failure, or fail-safe in case of total LOC.12,13 Reliability
analysis plays a fundamental role in this context, by
identifying failure modes criticality and providing
quantitative system failure rate evaluation.14–16
In this article, the reliability analysis has been car-
ried out through the following steps. First of all, the
cumulative probability for a catastrophic failure condi-
tion is defined, according to applicable airworthiness
certification regulations for a medium altitude long
endurance (MALE) UAV.17,18 The FCS layout is then
chosen, in terms of number of control surfaces, each
one actuated by a single EMAS. The possible FCS fail-
ure modes are analysed by a functional hazard assess-
ment (FHA) to find the most critical condition and to
derive the failure rate budget for a single EMAS. A
possible EMAS architecture is therefore defined, in
terms of number and type of internal redundancies.
Finally, a fault tree analysis (FTA) is performed to
evaluate the system failure rate and to compare it with
the target budget. The most critical paths of the FTA
are identified and discussed, by highlighting the EMAS
components that are more relevant for the reliability
level. A list of EMAS monitors capable of managing
system redundancies and providing satisfactory failure
coverage is finally given.
Safety budget allocation for UAV EMAS
Certification references
The design of an actuator for modern primary flight
controls (i.e. implementing automatic and/or autono-
mous functions) is strongly affected by the safety
requirements imposed at aircraft level by the airworthi-
ness regulations. This issue is overemphasised in case of
UAV applications, also for the lack of a unified certifi-
cation reference. The NATO airworthiness certification
regulation STANAG 4671:200917 is applicable to UAVs
having maximum take-off weight (MTOW) in the range
150–20,000 kgf flying above non-segregated airspace,
and its paragraph 1309 states that the cumulative prob-
ability of occurrence of catastrophic failure conditions
shall be lower than 1026 per flight hour. The Italian
Ministry of Defence technical directive AER(EP)-P.618
also provides guidelines for the safety objectives of
Italian Army UAV weighting more than 4000kgf
(Table 1). In particular, the cumulative probabilities of
failures with catastrophic and hazardous effects are
equal to those recommended by STANAG 4671, while
the requirements are more relaxed for failures impacting
on UAV reliability (i.e. with major or minor effects).
The reliability requirements of safety-critical equip-
ments derive from those at UAV-level (Table 1), and
also depend on UAV architecture, that is, on the num-
ber of failure conditions determining an event with
safety/reliability effects. For the preliminary design
phases, the AER(EP)-P.6 document (used in this work
as reference for the EMAS architecture definition) sug-
gests to assume 100 catastrophic failure conditions, and
to consequently scale all other objectives. This means
that the probability of occurrence of a single cata-
strophic failure condition shall be budgeted at 1028 per
flight hour.
Flight control actuation system layout and EMAS
failure rate budgeting
The work has been carried out with reference to the lay-
out of the FCS of a MALE UAV developed by Alenia
Aermacchi (see Figure 1). Provided that each surface is
moved by a dedicated EMAS, the flight control func-
tions are implemented as follows:
 Roll control: performed by four ailerons, two per
wing;
 Pitch control: performed by three elevators on
the horizontal tail;
 Yaw control: performed by two rudders, one per
each of the two vertical tails.
Table 1. UAV safety objectives for flight on non-segregated airspace: comparison between Italian and US military regulations.
Hazard risk index STANAG 4671:200917
(150 kgf<MTOW
< 20,000 kgf)
AER(EP).P-618
(MTOW 4000 kgf)
Catastrophic Hazardous Major Minor No safety
effect
Frequent p. 1023 pFH p. 1021 pFH Unacceptable
Probable p\1023 pFH p\1021 pFH
Remote p\1024 pFH p\1023 pFH
Extremely remote p\1025 pFH p\1025 pFH Acceptable
Extremely improbable p\1026 pFH p\1026 pFH
MTOW: maximum take-off weight.
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An excerpt of the preliminary FHA of the UAV
FCS is given in Table 2, together with the evaluation of
the derived EMAS failure rate requirement (lEMAS),
once that the AER(EP)-P.6 safety/reliability constraints
are applied. The calculation is made under the assump-
tion that the EMAS is only affected by random faults
(i.e. infant mortality and wear-out effects are
neglected), so that its failure probability density is
exponential.19 The results demonstrate that the roll
control function is the most critical one (Figure 2), and
that the dimensioning criterion for EMAS failure rate
is related to the total loss of 1 out of 4 ailerons.
EMAS architecture definition
High computational resources are needed to perform
the closed-loop control of EMAS, especially for current
and speed loops. For this reason, these functions cannot
be performed by the flight control computers (FCC),
but they must be implemented by dedicated electronics.
The control electronics can be integrated with the
actuator, obtaining the so-called smart actuators, or
separately installed into actuator control units (ACU).
The latter approach has been used for the proposed
EMAS, mainly to overcome installation problems:
Table 2. Failure rate budgeting for the flight control EMAS.
FHA outcomes EMAS failure rate budgeting
Failure mode Failed surfaces Effects Reliability constraint
from AER(EP)-P.6
Requirement
for lEMAS
Partial loss of aileron surface 1 Major 4 lEMAS\10
25 pFH \2.503 1026 pFH
2, on different wings Major 4 lEMAS
2\1025 pFH \1.583 1023 pFH
2, on the same wing Hazardous 2 lEMAS
2\1027 pFH \2.243 1024 pFH
Total loss of aileron surface 1 Hazardous 4 lEMAS\10
27 pFH \2.503 1028 pFH
2 Catastrophic 6 lEMAS
2\1028 pFH \4.083 1025 pFH
Partial loss of elevator surface 1 Minor 3 lEMAS\10
23 pFH \3.333 1024 pFH
2 Major 3 lEMAS
2\1025 pFH \1.833 1023 pFH
3 Hazardous lEMAS
3\1027 pFH \4.643 1023 pFH
Total loss of elevator surface 1 Hazardous 3 lEMAS\10
27 pFH \3.333 1028 pFH
2 Catastrophic 3 lEMAS
2\1028 pFH \5.773 1025 pFH
3 Catastrophic lEMAS
3\1028 pFH \2.153 1023 pFH
Partial loss of rudder surface 1 Major 2 lEMAS\10
25 pFH \53 1026 pFH
2 Hazardous lEMAS
2\1027 pFH \3.163 1024 pFH
Total loss of rudder surface 1 Hazardous 2 lEMAS\10
27 pFH \53 1028 pFH
2 Catastrophic lEMAS
2\1028 pFH \1024 pFH
EMAS: electro-mechanical actuator system; FHA: functional hazard assessment.
Partial loss is intended as a condition of performance degradation, but the surface motion is still safe.
Total loss is intended as a condition that causes a surface jam or unsafe motion.
Bold characters indicate the most stringent case for the maximum allowable EMAS failure rate requirement.
Figure 2. Example pf EMAS failure rate budgeting.
Figure 1. Flight control surfaces of the reference MALE UAV.
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smart actuators have larger dimensions, which in some
cases are not compatible with the airfoil thickness.
Functional requirements
In the reference application, the FCS has three FCCs
handling the air data and inertial sensor signals. The
FCCs exchange their data in order to process a com-
mon set of feedbacks and provide the EMAS with con-
sistent operating mode and set-point commands. The
operating mode and the set-point commands are the
inputs which enable the EMAS to perform its two main
functions: equipment health-monitoring and surface
control.
Equipment health-monitoring function. With this function,
the EMAS provides information to the FCCs about the
health state of its parts and components. These feed-
backs allow the FCCs to define the EMAS operating
mode, which can be
 Normal;
 Fail-operative, corresponding to the ‘system
reconfiguration’ mode, in which one or more
faults to EMAS components have occurred, and
they have been detected, isolated and (if applica-
ble) compensated, so that the system maintains
its performances to a satisfactory level;
 Fail-safe, corresponding to the ‘system recovery’
mode, in which one or more faults to EMAS
components have occurred, and they have been
detected and isolated, and the system is config-
ured to react to loads and environment without
lowering the safety of the whole aircraft.
Surface control function. With this function, the EMAS
provides motion control of the aerodynamic surface. In
normal and fail-operative modes, this is obtained by a
closed-loop control of the surface rotation, which
assures static and dynamic performances (high accu-
racy and resolution, low hysteresis, adequate motion
bandwidth and dynamic stiffness, while in fail-safe
mode the function only implies that the actuator oper-
ates without lowering the aircraft safety.
The health-monitoring algorithms, executed at high
rate both before and during flight (via Power-Up Built-
In-Test and Continuous Built-In-Test, respectively), are
performed within the ACU. In case of a detected fail-
ure, the ACU has the authority to set the EMAS in fail-
operative or fail-safe mode, communicating to the FCC
the health state. In case of lack of communication, the
FCC has the authority to command the EMAS transi-
tion to the fail-safemode.
Concerning the closed-loop control, it is digitally
achieved within the ACU computing processor by three
nested loops on EMAS position, motor speed and
motor current. The loops run at different frequencies
to guarantee adequate stability margins. Preliminary
design studies provide evidence of the possibility of
obtaining an EMAS position bandwidth of 7Hz, by
setting the sampling rate of current and speed loops at
10 kHz and the position loop at 500Hz.
In the fail-safe mode, the proposed EMAS is
designed to provide the surface with damping, in order
to avoid catastrophic effects (e.g. flutter instability).
This damping action is provided, once the motor is iso-
lated from the electrical supply, by imposing the short
circuit on its phases and by dissipating the regenerated
currents on a bank resistor.
Qualitative CA of a simplex EMAS
In order to identify the most critical fault modes affect-
ing the EMAS and to justify the proposed design solu-
tions, a qualitative criticality analysis (CA)19 is reported
here with reference to a simplex rotary EMAS com-
posed of the following:
 A simplex digital ACU, performing closed-loop
controls on motor currents, speed and position;
 A three-phase permanent magnet synchronous
motor;
 A mechanical transmission from the motor to
the aerodynamic surface;
 Three current sensors (one per phase);
 A resolver for the motor control;
 A rotary variable differential transformer
(RVDT) transducer for the rotation sensing.
The CA is developed following the approach used in
Balaban et al.,6 by defining three groups of failure
modes, depending on the component/assembly in which
the fault occurs:
 Electronic failures
 Electrical failures
 Mechanical/structural failures
As shown from Tables 3 to 5, each component/
assembly fault mode is analysed, by defining the possi-
ble fault causes and providing an estimation of the
following:
 Fault probability of occurrence (FPO) during
the operating time interval, defined selecting one
of the following five levels:19
8 Frequent (Level A)
8 Reasonably probable (Level B)
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8 Occasional (Level C)
8 Remote (Level D)
8 Extremely remote (Level E) Fault severity category (FSC) evaluated at
EMAS level, defined selecting one of the follow-
ing four categories:19
8 System loss (Category I)
8 System function loss (Category II)
8 System function degradation (Category III)
8 Unscheduled system repair or maintenance
(Category IV)
The CA results have been then reported in the criti-
cality matrix shown in Figure 3. The criticality matrix,
synthetically comparing the fault modes in terms of
severity and probability of occurrence, provides a tool
for assigning corrective action priorities. In particular,
the further along the diagonal line from the origin the
fault mode is recorded, the greater the criticality and
the more urgent the need for implementing corrective
action. It is worth noting that the criticality matrix of
the simplex EMAS has no fault modes classified as
Category II, since the system has only one function and
there is no difference between Category I and Category
II. It can be noted that for a simplex EMAS, several
corrective actions should be necessary to have chance
of being safety compliant.
Proposed self-monitoring solution
As depicted in Figures 4 and 5, the proposed EMAS is
composed of the following:
 The ACU, including
8 two independent computing sections, imple-
menting health-monitoring (MON lane) and
closed-loop control (CON lane);
8 a power section modulating the motor coil
currents, with three full H-bridges, each one
dedicated to a coil, so that the motor is dri-
ven with isolated phases;
Table 3. Qualitative criticality analysis of a simplex EMAS (electronic components’ failures).
Component/assembly Fault mode Fault mode ref. Fault cause FPO FSC
Power supply module Open circuit EC01 Wire crack D I
Short circuit EC02 Wire chafing D I
Insulation degradation
Thermal runway EC03 Component dielectric breakdown D I
Controller capacitor
open/short circuit
EC04 Component dielectric breakdown D I
Power Electronics
(MOSFETwith related circuitry)
e.g. MOSFETopen/
short circuit
EC05 Various C I
Control Electronics (CPU, etc.) e.g. CPU failure EC06 Various C I
FPO: fault probability of occurrence; FSC: fault severity category; MOSFET: metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor.
Table 4. Qualitative criticality analysis of a simplex EMAS (mechanical components’ failures).
Component/assembly Fault mode Fault mode ref. Fault cause FPO FSC
Surface link Backlash ME01 Wear of components C III
Jamming ME02 Wear of components E I
Structural failure ME03 Warping or load misalignment E I
Bearings Backlash ME04 Wear of components C III
Jamming ME05 Recirculating elements block E I
Wear of components
Collapse ME06 Warping or load misalignment E I
Output lever Structural failure ME07 Crack E I
Gearbox Backlash ME08 Wear of components C III
Jamming ME09 Wear of components E I
Collapse ME10 Crack E I
Seals Leakage ME11 Wear D III
ME12 Crack
Lubricant Loss of lubrication ME13 Contamination C III
ME14 Chemical breakdown
FPO: fault probability of occurrence; FSC: fault severity category.
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8 a cross-lane data link (CLDL), for the data
exchange between the lanes;
8 a supply voltage sensor (SVS);
8 a temperature sensor (TS), measuring the
ACU operating temperature;
8 three current sensors (CSa1, CSb1, CSc1),
used for closed-loop controls;
8 three current sensors (CSa2, CSb2, CSc2),
used for monitoring algorithms;
8 three voltage sensors (VSa, VSb, VSc) used
for monitoring algorithms;
8 a resolver (R) for the motor shaft rotation,
used for closed-loop control;
8 a transducer (RVDT1) of actuator rotation,
used for closed-loop control;
8 a transducer (RVDT2) of actuator rotation,
used for monitoring algorithms.
 The EMA, including
8 three-phase permanent magnet synchronous
motor with sinusoidal modulation;
8 a two-stage gearbox for the mechanical
power transmission.
The ACU CON lane, based on digital signal proces-
sor (DSP) technology, is able to manage both the
EMAS sensor interfaces and the pulse width
Table 5. Qualitative criticality analysis of a simplex EMAS (electrical components’ failures).
Component/assembly Fault mode Fault mode ref. Fault cause FPO FSC
Motor connectors Disconnection EL01 Disconnection E I
Contact degradation EL02 Intermittent connection D I
Motor coil Opened coil EL03 Wire crack C III
Shorted coil EL04 Wire chafing C III
Insulation degradation
Partially shorted coil EL05 Wire chafing C III
Insulation degradation
Motor rotor Magnet separation EL06 Bond degradation E I
Magnet demagnetisation EL07 Thermal runway C III
Resolver Opened coil EL08 Wire crack D I
Shorted coil EL09 Wire chafing D I
Insulation degradation
Disconnection EL10 Disconnection E I
Current sensors Opened coil EL11 Wire crack D II
Shorted coil EL12 Wire chafing D II
Insulation degradation
RVDT Opened coil EL13 Wire crack D I
Shorted coil EL14 Wire chafing D I
Insulation degradation
Disconnection EL15 Disconnection E I
Wiring Opened coil EL16 Wire crack D I
Shorted coil EL17 Wire chafing D I
Insulation degradation
FPO: fault probability of occurrence; FSC: fault severity category; RVDT: rotary variable differential transformer.
Figure 3. Criticality matrix for a simplex EMAS.
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modulation (PWM) drive of the motor phases. The
MON lane is based on an Advanced RISC Machines
(ARM) processor, selected to implement hardware dis-
similarity with the ACU CON Lane. The ARM
processor has reduced computing performances if com-
pared with the DSP, but it integrates two processors in
lock-step configuration to improve the processor error
detection (e.g. bus errors and memory errors).
EMAS health-monitoring algorithms
The three basic activities performed by the EMAS mon-
itoring algorithms are as follows:
 Fault detection: the operation of distinguishing
between normal and failed behaviour, carried
out by monitoring, processing and testing system
measurements;
 Fault isolation: the process of determining the
failed component/subsystem that is responsible
for abnormal behaviour after a failure has been
detected;
 Fault compensation: the process of responding to
the failure to recover some level of system
performance.
The following monitor algorithms have been defined
to detect the fault modes analysed during the reliability
analysis (a detailed description of the above-mentioned
monitor functions is out of the scope of this work):
1. Outer loop monitor, which predicts, by means of
a model, an expected EMAS response to inputs,
in order to detect overall system malfunctions;
Figure 4. Interface between the EMAS and the FCCs.
Figure 5. Self-monitoring EMAS architecture.
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2. Current monitor, which performs a check of the
current levels in the motor coils, to detect
opened coils and to protect from over-currents;
3. Cross-lane current monitor, which performs a
comparison between the motor currents mea-
sured by the CON and the MON lanes, to detect
sensor faults;
4. In-lane monitors on RVDTs and resolver, which
perform checks of the status of the sensors, to
detect component fault;
5. Cross-lane position monitor, which performs a
comparison between the positions measured by
the CON and the MON lanes, in order to detect
transducer faults;
6. Voltage supply monitor, which performs a check
of the voltage supply level, in order to detect a
voltage supply breakdown or a voltage sensor
fault;
7. PSU temperature monitor, which performs a
check of the PSU temperature level, in order to
detect an abnormal heating of the PSU or a TS
fault;
8. In-lane CPU monitors (watchdog) for both
CON and MON lanes;
9. Cross-lane voltage demand monitor, which per-
forms a comparison between the voltage
demand for PWM calculated by the CON and
the MON lanes, to detect CPU and I/O faults;
It is worth noting that combinations of these algo-
rithms can be implemented for health-state definition
at specific mission phases (power-up, pre-flight, etc.).
Effects of the architectural choices on the safety
compliance
The safety concerns related to the application
(Figure 3) are overcome by the proposed self-
monitoring architecture. In particular,
 the system reconfiguration covers the following
faults (thanks to the phase-isolating electronics,
the control loops are reconfigured and the motor
works without performance degradation with
only two coils):
8 Electrical failures to the motor coils (EL03,
EL04 and EL05, classified as C.III) and to
the current sensors (EL11 and EL12, classi-
fied as D.II);
8 The power electronics failures (EC05, classi-
fied as C.I)
 the system recovery covers the following faults:
8 Control electronics failure (EC06, classified
as C.I);
8 Resolver electrical failures (EL08 and EL09,
classified as D.I);
8 RVDT electrical failures (EL13 and EL14,
classified as D.I);
8 Wiring failures (EL16 and EL17, classified
as D.I);
8 Power supply failures (EC01, EC02, EC03
and EC04, classified as D.I);
8 Magnet faults (EL06, classified as E.I, and
EL07, classified as C.III);
8 Resolver and RVDT disconnections (EL10
and EL15, classified as E.I).
All other EMAS faults can be covered via mainte-
nance programme (e.g. all the jamming and structural
failures) or by specific design solutions (e.g. standard
rugged connectors).
Figures 6 and 7 show the FTA related to the total
loss of the surface control (i.e. total loss of the EMAS),
with reference to the simplex EMAS and to the self-
Table 6. EMAS components failure rate data at 55C in AUC
environment.20–23
Component/assembly Fault mode ref. Failure rate
(3 1026 pFH)
Power supply module EC01 0.030
EC02 0.030
EC03 0.030
EC04 0.030
Power electronics EC05 0.922
Control electronics EC06 0.820
Fail-safe electronicsa EC07 25.546
Surface link ME02 0.001
ME03 0.001
Bearings ME05 0.001
ME06 0.001
Output lever ME07 0.001
Gearbox ME09 33 1024
ME10 33 1024
Motor connectors EL01 0.004
EL02 0.380
Motor coil EL03 1.14
EL04 1.14
EL05 1.14
Motor rotor EL06 1024
Resolver EL08 0.162
EL09 0.162
EL10 0.003
Current sensors EL11 0.156
EL12 0.156
RVDT EL13 0.270
EL14 0.270
EL15 0.005
Cabling EL16 0.547
El17 0.547
RVDT: rotary variable differential transformer.
aAdditional electronics (switch assembly) for the self-monitoring
solution.
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monitoring solution. The failure rate data used in the
FTA have been obtained from the literature20–23 by
assuming 55C operating temperature and airborne
uninhabited cargo (AUC) environment (Table 6).
The simplex solution has a 8.828 3 1026 pFH prob-
ability of total loss of surface control (Figure 6), so it
is completely inadequate for the application, due to
the failure rates of the electronic and electrical sections
(6.472 3 1026 and 2.35 3 1026 pFH, respectively).
On the other hand, the self-monitoring solution
(Figure 7), with a 5.75 3 1029 pFH probability of
total loss of surface control, is safety compliant (Table
2). The FTA highlights that this result has been
obtained by adding the fail-safe electronics, which, in
case of electronic or electrical failures identified by the
health-monitoring algorithms, allows to isolate the
motor from the electrical supply and to impose the
short circuit on its phases (for aerodynamic surface
damping). This design thus implies that the EMAS
safety level is essentially driven by the mechanical fail-
ures, characterised by 5.6 3 1029 pFH probability of
occurrence.
Figure 6. FTA related to the total loss of the simplex EMAS (failure rates3 1026 pFH).
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Conclusion
The architectural design of a fault-tolerant EMAS for
MALE UAV’s is discussed. Starting from a survey on
available airworthiness certification references in case of
flight on non-segregated airspace, the safety objectives
at EMAS level are defined, and a qualitative CA is per-
formed on a simplex EMAS, to identify the fault modes
and causes and to classify their probability of occur-
rence and severity level. The proposed architecture over-
comes the safety concerns of the simplex solution by
using redundant components managed by a health-
monitoring electronics. The EMAS actually includes
two independent computing sections, implementing
monitor and closed-loop control functions, and a phase-
isolating power electronics. Thus, the actuator has three
operating modes: normal, fail-operative (in which the
EMAS is capable of operating with two out of three
motor coils) and fail-safe (in which the motor phases are
shorted and the regenerated currents create a damping
torque on the control surface). To verify the effective-
ness of the architectural choices, a quantitative evalua-
tion of the probability of total loss of the surface control
is performed via FTA on both the simplex and the self-
monitoring solutions. The analysis highlights that the
failure rate of the simplex solution (8.828 3 1026 pFH)
is inadequate for the application due to the high failure
probability of the electronic and electrical sections. On
the other hand, the proposed self-monitoring solution
demonstrates to be safety compliant with a failure rate
(5.75 3 1029 pFH) that is essentially driven by the
mechanical failures.
Figure 7. FTA related to the total loss of the self-monitoring EMAS (failure rates3 1026 pFH).
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